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Althusser and ideological criticism of
the arts
RICHARD ELDRIDGE
Louis Althusser's 1970 essay "Ideology and ideological state appar-
atuses"1 is arguably the most influential and important document in
contemporary critical practice and its theory. In one way this is
puzzling, for the essay contains almost nothing that can be recog-
nized as an argument. It does not put forward a causal theory of the
rise and fall of forms of social life. It offers no deductions, and it
contains only a few sketchily described examples of ideologies. The
essay is instead filled with oracular pronouncements, couched in a
terminology partly invented and partly cobbled together from the
Marxist tradition and from Lacan.
Yet there it is. Althusser's work receives more extended discussion
— thirty-five consecutive pages, plus numerous occasional references
— in Fredric Jameson's 1981 The Political Unconscious,2 perhaps the
most important American text in so-called New Historicist criticism,
than any of the literary works Jameson considers except Conrad's
Lord Jim. Althusser is the principal subject of the longest chapter in
Rosalind Coward and John Ellis's 1977 Language and MateriaJism,3
itself one of the principal theoretical works of so-called cultural
materialist criticism in England, and the discussion of "Ideology and
ideological state apparatuses" is the centerpiece of that chapter.
Terry Eagleton observes that in this essay "Althusser has taught us to
regard.. .[the] misperceptions [of] the infantile narcissist of the Lac-
anian mirror stage.. .as an indispensable structure of all ideology,"4
where ideology is omnipresent. By allusion the essay appears in
hundreds of titles such as The Ideology of the Aesthetic, The
Romantic Ideology, Aesthetics and the Ideology of Form, Ideology
and Imagination in the Victorian Novel, and so on. Teachers and
students of literature will readily recognize the game of "hunt the
ideology" - ferreting out an author's necessary but unconscious
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reinforcements ("reinscriptions" they are often called) of various
forms of class domination - that is typically played in advanced
literary classrooms. In the criticism of the visual arts, critics such as
John Barrell are now busy unmasking the traditional seductions of
artistic form and its connoisseurship, instead focusing on, for
example, Constable's implicit simultaneous acknowledgment and
devaluing of the existence and importance of displaced agricultural
laborers, often represented in miniature in the foreground or back-
ground of his landscape paintings. "Ideology and ideological state
apparatuses" is the essay of Althusser's that is included in Adams
and Searle's anthology Critical Theory Since 1965, where Althusser's
work is said to be "much used by literary theorists" and where we are
told that this is "one of Althusser's most influential essays."5 A recent
critical obituary of Althusser calls "Ideology and ideological state
apparatuses" Althusser's "single most influential text."6 Together
with the work of Raymond Williams, Althusser's writings are the
most decisive theoretical influence in the development of British
cultural materialism. Together with the work of Foucault, they are the
most decisive theoretical influence in American New Historicism.
Insofar as cultural materialism, New Historicism, and politicized
Lacanism have themselves affected feminism, Althusser's work
forms much of the theoretical basis of advanced feminist criticism as
well. "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses" is the most general
articulation of a critical sensibility for which ideology is all-
important and economic theory largely irrelevant. The essay has both
helped to form that sensibility, directly and indirectly, and given it
powerful expression where it exists on its own.
Yet, to repeat: "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses" offers
very little that can be recognized as an argument. Such premises and
assumptions as it relies on and urges are far from being readily
acceptable starting points that then lead us to more interesting
conclusions. They are not always even readily intelligible. What are
we to make of this situation?
The most plausible initial guess to understand the influence and
importance for criticism of "Ideology and ideological state appara-
tuses" is that the essay, despite its turgidity and lack of argu-
mentation, somehow expresses a view of human life that contempo-
rary academic critics of literature and the arts find to be compelling
on its own. Hence investigating Althusser's essay to tease out this
view promises not only to elucidate Althusser, but also to help us to
bring to consciousness a conception of human life that is dominant
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within critical studies in our time. Having such a view before us
explicitly, we can then begin to think all at once about topics that will
emerge as deeply interconnected: how Althusser's view might be
criticized, what the shape of critical studies might be other than
ideology criticism, and what general views about human life and its
prospects of social expression or development are plausible for us.
ALTHUSSER AND HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY
"Ideology and ideological state apparatuses" elaborates four inter-
related theses. "Ideology has no history" (239B); "Ideology represents
the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of
existence" (241A); "Ideology has a material existence" (242B); and
"my central thesis: Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects"
(244A). Each of these theses helps to establish the meanings and uses
of "ideology" in Althusser's analysis of culture, cultural production,
and cultural reproduction, where, as he notes, ideology is "a reality
which needs a little discussion" (239A). Two of these theses - the
first and third, on the lack of history and the material existence of
ideology - draw on and are best explicated in terms of a Marxist
theory of history. The other two - the second and fourth, on the
relations between individuals and ideology - also draw on terms and
ideas from Lacanian psychoanalysis. Of all these theses, the second is
the most fully summary statement of Althusser's view of human life.
"Ideology represents the imaginary relations of individuals to their
real conditions of existence." Here we are told just how ideology
always mediates between individuals and reality. Understanding
how and why this mediation always takes place, according to
Althusser, is necessary for understanding what it means to say that
art is ideological or that artistic and literary works always reinscribe
ideologies.
But this thesis - "Ideology represents the imaginary relation of
individuals to their real conditions of existence" - drawing together
the Marxist and Lacanian strands of the essay, uses terms ("imagin-
ary," "real," "ideology") that themselves stand in need of expli-
cation. What are the imaginary and the real for Althusser? What is
ideology that it has no history and yet has a material existence? Just
what does the summary thesis say? It is best to begin by thinking
about Marx.
To say that ideology has no history and has a material existence, or
elsewhere, as Althusser puts it, that ideology "has no history of its
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own" (240B) and that "its history is outside it" (240A), is in the first
instance to say that philosophical idealism is false. Or, as Marx
himself puts it in the 1859 Preface to A Contribution to a Critique of
Political Economy, "It is not the consciousness of men that deter-
mines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that
determines their consciousness."7 In history agents conceive of
things in various ways and form various plans of life that lead to
action. Culture seems to result from the accummulated actions of
individual, intentional agents. But in fact this appearance is deeply
misleading, for agents form their ideas and plans of life only by taking
up conceptions and possibilities of life that their cultures have made
available to them, and cultures in turn are shaped by economic forces
and relations. How we produce and reproduce the conditions of
human life, both what forces or powers of production are available to
us and the social relations through which these forces are deployed,
largely determine what we will think and do. "Ideology, then, is for
Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and
vain, constituted by the 'day's residues' from the only full and
positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material
individuals materially producing their existence. It is on this basis
that ideology has no history" (240A).
The most systematic development of a Marxist conception of
history is in G. A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence.
Where Althusser is, at best, difficult, Cohen is startlingly clear. It is
instructive therefore to compare Althusser's conception of the deter-
mination of culture with Cohen's account of Marx's views. Using the
1859 Preface as the centerpiece of his interpretation, Cohen ascribes
two central theses to Marx: "(a) The productive forces tend to develop
throughout history (the Development Thesis); and (b) The nature of
the production relations of a society is explained by the level of
development of its productive forces (the Primacy Thesis proper)."8
Productive forces are human capacities and powers to shape or work
natural materials so as to satisfy human needs, both biologically
given and created. They grow principally through the growth of
"productively useful science,"9 which is then put to use in techno-
logical innovation, though this is not the only means of growth of
productive power: growth in population, for example, will produce
increased labor power. The level of development of the productive
forces may be gauged by measuring their capacity to produce a
surplus of humanly useful goods, over and above the holdings of
goods (including machines and machine tools themselves) that
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existed prior to their deployment. The development thesis states not
simply that the productive forces have grown throughout history, but
rather that they have a universal tendency to grow. That tendency
may be inhibited on occasion, but not too often (for it would then be
implausible to see it at work in history), and when the productive
forces do grow, they must grow not "for a miscellany of uncoord-
inated reasons,"10 but rather because it is, as it were, in their nature,
or their nature in relation to human nature, to grow.
Cohen argues in favor of the Development Thesis by making two
further claims, one historical and one a set of premises about human
nature. The historical claim is that by and large productive forces
have grown. "Societies rarely replace a given set of productive forces
by an inferior one."11 So far this might be true, but the result merely of
accident or of political decisions autonomously taken by agents or
groups, not the result of an autonomous tendency toward growth on
the part of the productive forces. The premises about human nature
then take us from the historical facts to the existence of a tendency.
Those premises are that human beings exist in situations of relative
scarcity (not all their wants are readily satisfied), that they are capable
of recognizing their wants, and that they are intelligent enough to
develop new means to satisfy the wants they have recognized.12 It
might be that these facts about human nature obtained, but did not
regularly result in the growth of the productive forces, for the ability
of human beings to develop means of satisfying their wants might be
regularly inhibited by their pursuit of other interests. But the his-
torical claim shows that this has not in fact happened. The produc-
tive forces have generally grown, and they have grown autono-
mously, in the face of whatever other interests human beings have
had, so that we are entitled to conclude that there is an autonomous
tendency for them to grow.
The Development Thesis, now established, is then used as part of
the argument for the Primacy Thesis. Relations of production are
social relations through which productive powers are deployed.
People work, deploying productive forces, as serfs giving up part of
their product to the lord, or as slaves, or as laborers selling their
labor-power in return for a wage. People receive goods produced
through the use of the productive powers variously as serfs, slaves, or
workers, lords, masters, or owners. The Primacy Thesis then states that
the existence of a given set of productive relations - master-slave;
lord-serf; owner-worker - is explained by the level of develop-
ment of the productive forces. A given set of productive relations will
come to inhibit the autonomous tendency of the productive forces to
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grow. For example, the continual use of slave labor to extract luxury
products will inhibit the investment of the social surplus in new
technology. When that happens, then, given that the productive
forces are tending to grow, that set of relations of production will
disappear in favor of a new set of relations under which maximum
growth of productive power can take place. There are, as Marx puts it,
correspondences between social forms and productive ones. And
these correspondences must result from the selection constraint
exercised on relations of production by the productive forces, for the
tendency of the productive forces to grow is autonomous.13
A similar sort of selection is then exercised by the relations of
production on ideas. Classes, or groups of people producing or
receiving goods under definite social roles, through which they
struggle for goods with members of other classes, ''are receptive to
whatever ideas are likely to benefit them."14 Hence classes will either
develop or select from independently available candidates the sets of
ideas about appropriate life plans, political arrangements, religious
duties, gender roles, and so on that will increase the share of the
social product that their members will receive. These ideas will be
their ideology. The ruling class, the class which owns or controls the
deployment of the forces of production, will have the ability to
propagate its ideas most effectively and will be able to develop
religious, political, educational, and cultural institutions that will
both reflect and inculcate them. While it may be possible for political,
religious, educational, or artistic ideas to arise spontaneously, such
ideas will not be effective in shaping either social relations of
production or social institutions unless they suit the material inter-
ests of the current ruling classes or perhaps their nascent successors.
In the long run, Cohen argues, human productive powers will have
increased under capitalism to such an extent, giving us such an
ability to satisfy human needs, that it will then be manifestly
unreasonable for workers any longer to accept the curse of toil in
exchange for relatively meager wages. Capitalism "cannot realize the
possibilities of liberation it creates. It excludes liberation by febrile
product innovation, huge investment in sales and advertising, con-
trived obsolescence. It brings society to the threshold of abundance
and locks the door. For the promise of abundance is not an endless
flow of goods but a sufficiency produced with a minimum of
unpleasant exertion."15 Once this contradiction between promise
and its inhibition is manifest, the expropriators will be expropriated
and capitalist relations of production will be done away with.
In comparison with Cohen's classical, teleological Marxism,
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Althusser's Marxism is distinctively structural and anti-teleological.
Where Cohen sees productive forces autonomously tending to
develop and through their development tending further to lead
toward a society of human freedom, Althusser sees continuing class
struggle, without end, and continuing frustrations of human free-
doms, in various ways. "Superstructures," or educational, religious,
juridical, and cultural institutions that reproduce class relations by
propagating class identities, Althusser writes, "are never seen to step
aside respectfully [in favor of a non-class society of equal freedom]
when their work is done.. .From the first moment to the last, the
lonely hour of the 'last instance' never comes."16 In place of Cohen's
optimism and claim that the forces of production tend autonomously
(and beneficently) to grow, we find Althusser's pessimism and sense
of the continuing force of political, superstructural relations and
institutions. Indeed, in the context of France in the 1960s, when
bureaucratic communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe was still
apparently strong and expansionist, the sort of optimistic, beneficent
forces of production Marxism that Cohen later elaborated from
Marx's texts in the 1970s might well have seemed both historically
inaccurate and dangerous. In such a context, economic determinism
may well have seemed to point toward forced development under
five-year plans. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely given
Althusser's affiliation with the French Communist Party, it may have
seemed important to explain why the communists had not come to
power, why republican political institutions had not altered, in
industrialized France. It may well have seemed important then to
emphasize that political arrangements resist full determination by
the forces of production, even while remaining in some sense "in the
last instance" subordinated to them. Althusser's effort was hence to
find a way between philosophical idealism, humanism, and volunta-
rism, on the one hand, and forces of production determinism, on the
other. "Central to Althusser's work is his concern to provide an
account of the social totality which avoids a crude economic determi-
nism and allows for the effectivity of the superstructures whilst at the
same time retaining a notion of determination by the base in the 'last
instance.'"17
Althusser's central move in navigating between idealist volunta-
rism and economic determinism is to introduce the notion of the
overdetermination of superstructural ideas and institutions. Not only
are these ideas and institutions conditioned by economic life, they
also display a kind of structural or internal causality. Certain ideas
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and institutions logically require further ideas and institutions for
their existence and intelligibility. Just as, for example, the concepts
"adult" and "child" are internally related, in that each is essentially
defined and explained in terms of the other, so the concepts "prop-
erty owner" and "plaintiff in a civil suit," together with all their
surrounding institutions, are internally related. What it is to sue for
damages must be explained in terms of what it is to own property, and
what it is to own property must be explained, among other things, in
terms of what it is to be able legitimately to defeat such suits, to be
able to claim protection from theft, and so forth. A structural
causality obtains among these concepts. There is a clear sense in
which property owners and plaintiffs, and the institutions under
which they exist, are what they are by virtue of their internal
relations, and not only by virtue of the development of the productive
forces. According to Althusser, this overdetermination - internal,
structural causality in addition to conditioning by economic life -
gives to superstructural ideas and institutions a kind of partial
autonomy or effectivity.18 The cost, however, of introducing this
notion of overdetermination, avoiding both idealist voluntarism and
economic determinism, is that there seems to be no room left for any
source or agency of change. If not from accumulated acts of indi-
vidual will, and if not from the autonomous tendency of the forces of
production to grow, then from what are transformations in social
structures to come? Althusser "seems better placed to account for the
persistence of a structure than for transition and change."19 A certain
pessimism, favoring the sublimities of detached understanding of
social life as it stands over solidarity and substantive transformation,
results, it seems, from the move between idealist voluntarism and
economic determinism.
Human beings thus live under the necessity of producing and
reproducing their material conditions of existence. This necessity is
lived out under a further necessity of having some structured social
arrangements or other, within which there is always relative domi-
nation, as those with the responsibility of enforcing a social order
must always have rights and powers that are denied to others. And it
is at this social level, where distinct social classes with distinct but
internally related rights and powers face off against one another, that
the formation of human ideals is materially conditioned. "Material,"
in Althusser's writing, thus means not "pertaining to the forces of
production or to physical nature and our powers to rearrange it," but
rather "pertaining to the way in which within a structured system of
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opposed classes people produce and reproduce their conditions of
existence."
All this is taken for granted in "Ideology and ideological state
apparatuses," not argued for. Althusser insistently emphasizes the
importance in human history not of forces of production, but of
relations of production, class relations. These insistences amount to a
kind of litany about reality. The ways in which individuals think of
their lives "in the last analysis arise from the relations of production,
and from relations arising from the relations of production" (242A).
"The reality in question [out of which ideology is constituted].. .is
indeed, in the last resort, the reproduction of the relations of pro-
duction and of the relations deriving from them" (249A). "Ideologies
are 'born'.. .from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from
their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the
struggle" (250B). Opposition to forces of production Marxism,
coupled with Marxist opposition to idealism, has here led to relations
of production Marxism.
Althusser's skepticism about the possibility of a society of full and
equal human freedom, let alone as the appointed destiny of humanity
through the growth of its productive powers, is further partly
expressed in considerations drawn from Lacan's accounts of the
formation of conscious and self-conscious human subjects. Lacan
describes not the dismissal or disappearance of the human subject,
but rather a decentered, emergent, and internally self-opposed
human subject, yet for all that a subject nonetheless. For Althusser,
the human subject as Lacan describes it will be the subject of
ideology, that is, the person who necessarily has some ideology or
other, some form of false consciousness.
Lacan's principal interest as a psychoanalyst is in the material of
the analytic situation, in what patients say in recounting their
dreams, fantasies, wishes, obsessions, and so forth. On the basis of his
encounters with this material from various patients in analysis, and
developing from his reading of Freud, Lacan is led to posit the
existence of an order or register or mode of human experience, prior
to the entry of the human subject into language, discursive conscious-
ness, and self-consciousness.20 This initial order of experience, the
imaginary, is characterized above all by immediacy. There is no
subject-object differentiation, no awareness of one's own body as
one's own, as a home for a subject, and no subject-subject differenti-
ation. Here there is no desire for specific objects, for there is no
awareness of objects as objects, but only a generalized Jack of
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completeness of being, a generalized, uncomprehended, and uncon-
ceptualized dependence on a world one knows not. Specific and
self-conscious subjectivity then emerges through two stages of devel-
opment: first through the formation of an imago or image of a brighter,
better, wholer self whom one wishes to be, formed at the age of six to
eight months, as one experiences one's mirror image as this wholer,
more complete imago, and secondly through entry, continuously
effected from the ages of about one year to two-and-a-half, into the
symbolic order of language, wherein one becomes able to conceptua-
lize and name objects, and hence able as a now self-conscious subject
to desire specific things. Lacan emphasizes two features of this course
of development, two related modes of loss of contact with reality that
occur within it. Within this course of development, the self-
conscious subject who is coming into existence loses contact with
and represses both the pre-linguistic subject of the Jack and the world
as it is (a world not of discrete objects, but an undifferentiated world
that mysteriously induces and remedies lacks - this might be called
''Mother" some day). These two separations - from preconscious
subjectivity and from a material world that is preobjectual - are
necessary for the development of explicitly human propositional or
judgmental consciousness or subjectivity. To be able to say or judge
that here is an F, and so to experience the world as objectual, one
must be able to deploy a structured system of internally related
signifiers. What one then says or judges within the symbolic order of
signification will then be overdetermined, just as in Althusser super-
structural ideas and institutions are overdetermined. For Lacan, all
human utterances within the symbolic order are both pressured or
conditioned by prelinguistic material needs on the part of subjects
and structured or internally determined by the internal relations
among concepts and expressions that are present in a particular
language. (These are valuable points against computational linguis-
tics and scientific semantics.)
The conscious subject thus comes to be in separation from what
there really is: from both its own preconscious, deep subjectivity, and
from reality as it is preconsciously experienced and genuinely is.
What the now conscious subject or ego then explicitly desires will
hence always be an inadequate, too specific substitute for the ful-
fillment of a more primordial and still deeply persistent lack. The
object of desire will now be specifically conceived of and named
(constructed) in the terms set by a culture, more or less arbitrarily,
given the fluid nature of reality in itself. The real, according to Lacan,
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is a set of linguistically constructed objects of desire, and "the real"
that is thus constructed is not what there really is. What one then
desires is never fully one's own, never the primordial, sometime
lack-filling reality that was once sought and is still sought, at least by
the being whom one most deeply is. The unconscious, the locus of
this primordial lack, is what is left over and repressed in this course
of development. It is material from this part of the subject, the
unconscious, that then surfaces in the material of the analytic
situation, the patient's dream reports, wishes, fantasies, and obses-
sions, as well as always covertly pressuring even more routine and
conventionalized utterances.
What Lacan calls the Spaltung (splitting) of the subject or the division of the
subject.. .results from the fact that he speaks and from the fact of his insertion
into the symbolic order. By mediating himself in his discourse, the subject in
effect destroys the immediate relation of self to self, and constructs himself in
language.. .as he wishes to see himself, as he wishes to be seen, and thereby
alienates himself in language.
This is the best way of conceiving the establishing of an unconscious. If the
image the subject makes of himself for himself is a lure, then his desire will be
lost in its real implication to his consciousness and will be conveyed in a
demand (that is, in spoken discourse and in accordance with the exigencies
of Culture) in which it will be only a metonymy of itself.21
Lacan's views about subject development are of considerable use in
illuminating all at once the fragility of our life with language, our
buried creative potentials for transforming routinized expressive
systems, and analogies between the resistances of artists to routinized
systems of expression and the utterances and behaviors of neurotics.
As a general theory of human subjectivity, however, these views also
have distinct weaknesses. They tend first toward an odd mix of
Cartesian individualism about a deep prelinguistic self and Hera-
clitean materialism about reality, encouraging peculiar and implausi-
ble conceptions of a deep self and of a fluid reality as non-emergent,
primordial, and subject to repression through the processes of subject
construction. It is as though Lacan were arguing that a person who is
lost in the dark and then acquires a flashlight becomes thereby less
fully herself and less fully in contact with reality than prior to
acquiring the flashlight. Since such a person can now with the
flashlight identify discrete objects through the darkness, such a
person has now lost contact with a pre-flashlight, groping subjectivity
and with the "reality" of obscure things in darkness. Second, Lacan's
views about subject development are not in the first instance dis-
tinctly political. For Lacan, it is language in general, any language,
200
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2010Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511659492.010
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Library, on 28 Feb 2018 at 19:55:49, subject to the Cambridge
Althusser and ideological criticism of the arts
accession to which involves repression of preconscious subjectivity.
Repression is not in the first instance a matter of living under a
specifically unjust political system or set of social arrangements, and
its undoing, in so far as it is at least partly possible, is more
immediately a matter for private psychoanalytic therapy than for
public political action. Third, Lacan's normative views about human
subjectivity, in his orientations toward the private and the precon-
scious, are thin and implausible. It is for him a necessary truth that in
entering into any language or system of expression, one is forced "to
misconstrue the particular meaning of [one's] life in false communi-
cation,"22 that is, to distort and betray one's prelinguistic subjecti-
vity. "We get used to the real. The truth we repress."23 As a result,
since we do this, the way forward is an always impossible way back
toward prelinguistic subjectivity rather than toward articulate
expressiveness.
Althusser's views are nowadays often presented as merely deriva-
tive from the deeper views of Lacan. It is Lacan, not Althusser,
Coward and Ellis write, who "demonstrates the construction of the
subject in language.. .Lacan's concept of 'the imaginary' is a more
subtle instrument for understanding this process"24 of subject for-
mation than Althusser's theory of ideology. "It is only with [Lacan's]
theory of the subject [- not Althusser's -] that Marxism can move
towards a destruction of the division between subject and object,
which underlies its [deplorable] return to idealist thought."25 In fact,
however, it is current critical, politicized Lacanism that derives
much of its appeal from Althusser and the Marxist tradition, not the
other way around. It is Althusser's account of the partial autonomy of
superstructural ideas and institutions, themselves structured like a
language by internal relations, that enables Lacan's views about
subject development to be connected up with a specifically political
account of class domination. Without this connection, Lacan's views
imply nothing about either the omnipresence of class relations in
society or the repressions involved in the existence of superstructural
social institutions. Lacanism may in a way enable relations of
production Marxism to go forward, to articulate further views about
the subject in society, but it cannot found or establish relations of
production Marxism on its own.
What then is the source of the appeal of Althusser's conception of
subjects of class-related ideology? Althusser is not producing a
theory of history. The shift on his part from forces of production
Marxism to relations of production Marxism where relations may
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themselves be formed autonomously, as people pursue their various
religious, scientific, or political interests, is in fact a shift away from a
genuinely explanatory theory of history, according to which class
relations and ideologies are explained by the requirements of
growing productivity. Althusser is not interested in tracing the
ultimate causal antececents of social formations. While he acknowl-
edges that "ideologies have a history of their own (although it is
determined in the last instance by the class struggle)" (240B),
Althusser is not in "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses"
interested in that (vague) causal determination, insisting instead that
"ideology in general has no history, not in a negative sense (its
history is external to it), but in an absolutely positive sense" (240B).
Nor, though he avails himself of their idioms, is he deriving his views
about subjects and ideology from the views of Lacan or Saussure. Just
what is he doing?
In explicating the slogan that ideology in general has no history,
that ideology is "a non-historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical
reality, in the sense in which [its] structure and functioning are
immutable, present in the same form throughout what we can call
history" (240B), Althusser appeals to "a theoretical reference point:"
Freud's account of the role of the unconscious in the dream-work. In
what sense is Freud's theory of dreaming in any way structural or
non-historical?
Freud distinguishes, as Althusser notes, between the manifest
content of a dream, or the dream as reported, and its latent content. In
The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud sketches explanations of the
formations and significances (latent contents) of various dream
reports by describing what he calls the dream-work. The general
theory of the dream-work involves the specification of three kinds of
influences that are always present in the formation of any dream
report or manifest content: (1) the thoughts of the day (what one has
heard, read, seen, thought, and so on in the course of the day's
experiences), (2) various thoughts that are naturally present at
various stages of psychogenesis (infantile envies, wishes,
resentments, transferences, etc. and their repressed remainders in the
lives of adults), and (3) the mechanisms of the dream-work: conden-
sation, displacement, considerations of representability, and second-
ary revision.26 Influences (1) and (2) together form the latent content
of the dream; (3), the mechanisms of the dream-work, then translate
that latent content into the dream as reported or manifest content, as,
for example, visual images to express wishes are sought, narrative
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coherence is introduced, thoughts are combined or condensed with
one another, and substitutes for the objects of deep wishes and
revenges are found. In any dream, however, some material from the
day, some material from the life of the unconscious since infancy,
and the mechanisms of the dream-work always combine to generate
the dream as remembered and reported. In a clear sense, that (1), (2),
and (3) always figure in the formation of the manifest content is an
eternal (human) fact, not a human historical one. And it seems
equally likely that it is an eternal (human) fact that there are dreams.
It is like this, according to Althusser, with ideology. His structural
Marxism consists in his effort to describe the perennially present
sources and mechanisms of formation of very general views people
hold about how human flourishing and freedom may be secured
under certain sets of social institutions. Ideology is here "the system
of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of man or a
social group" (239A), a kind of always false consciousness about how
equal human freedom may be secured through the operations of
various religious, artistic, trade union, sporting, familial, etc. organi-
zations and institutions (the ideological state apparatuses). It is the
manifest content of culture, formed by a sort of always present
ideology-work, that it is the business of the structural Marxist to
specify. How does that ideology-work take place?
The latent content of ideology is the existing set of relations of
production, class relations, under which human beings work and
under which the goods that they produce are distributed. Under these
class relations, there are various modes of unfreedom and domi-
nation. Certain people or groups of people will have rights and
powers that others will lack. In that sense, there will not be equal
freedom. The ideology-work consists in reacting evaJuatively to
existing relations of production. Perhaps these relations are simply
accepted as productive of full equal freedom, so that the proper job of
educational, artistic, religious, etc. organizations (the ideological
state apparatuses) is then seen as that of forming subjects to enter into
and accept these existing relations. Perhaps alternatively, existing
relations are seen (correctly) as embodying unequal freedom, and
alternative relations genuinely productive of full equal freedom are
then imagined (dreams of a new society), together with the edu-
cational, religious, artistic, etc. infrastructures of reproduction that
they would require. But in any case, whether accepting, reformist, or
revolutionist, these evaluations are one and all false in their envi-
sioning of some condition of full equal freedom under some relations
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of production or other. Individuals imagine that there might be such a
condition, and thus generate ideology, but in this imagining are
victims of false consciousness. Society requires some social organi-
zation, some relations of production. Any such organizations and
relations will involve some unfreedom, some arbitrarily unequal
rights and powers attaching to dominant and subordinate classes. In
reaction people imagine that this is not so. But in this imagining they
are mistaken. We can no more cease living within existing relations of
production nor cease imagining either them or some alternatives to
embody full equal freedom than we can cease having unconscious
thoughts, wishes, fantasies or cease dreaming. "Ideology," we may
say, "represents the imaginary relation of individuals to their real
conditions of existence" (241A). Or, more fully,
All ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the
existing relations of production (and the other relations that derive from
them), but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the
relations of production and the relations that derive from them. What is
represented in ideology is not the system of the real relations which govern
the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals
to the real relations in which they live. (242A)
But why can't we stop doing this? Why is the relation of indi-
viduals to existing relations of production "necessarily an imaginary
relation" (242A), one marked by false consciousness or belief about
the possibility of a society of full equal freedom under some relations
of production or other, existing or alternative? Why can't we either
get it right, and successfully envision and fashion a society of fully
equal freedom, or just give up such envisionings and accept the
relatively tragic character of human life (perhaps still recognizing
that some social organizations embody more freedom than others)?
Here is where Althusser appears to draw substantively on Lacan.
Echoing Lacan's account of the formation of the unconscious accord-
ing to Freud, Althusser writes that "It is clear that this ideological
constraint and preappointment, and all the rituals of rearing and then
education in the family, have some relationship with what Freud
... registered by its effects [a Lacanism] as being the unconscious"
(246B). Roughly, just as the experience on the part of preconscious
subjects of a primordial lack, now buried in the unconscious and
productive of fantasies, obsessions, and neuroses, persists in the lives
of conscious subjects (whose desires are always inadequate metony-
mies or substitute-successors to that lack), so the experience of
relations of production and their unfreedom likewise persists, as
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human beings come to speak the language of culture, to develop
(always inadequate) evaluative responses to social life as they assume
socio-cultural identities. Althusser's name for the process through
which subjects are ideologically constituted as having specific evalu-
ative responses to existing relations of production is interpellation.
Human subjects coming to be under existing relations of production
are called to respond to them one way or another by existing
evaluative languages and stances. Even refusal to accept an existing
invitation to evaluate is itself a language of evaluation, the language
of outsiderliness, which is to say that "ideology has no outside"
(246A).
But this appearance of dependence on Lacan is in part misleading,
or, where genuine, unhelpful, in so far as Lacan's account of subject
formation is not itself related to class. And in fact Althusser does
present another, historical argument, for the claim that ideology -
(mistakenly) imagining relations of production of equal freedom - is
for us inevitable, like dreaming. This argument is somewhat buried in
the text; it is not even marked as itself a line of argument. But it is the
source, perhaps, of whatever appeal Althusser's text and ideology-
criticism that makes use of Lacan now have for critics of the arts.
"Why," Althusser asks, "do men 'need' this imaginary trans-
position of their real conditions of existence in order to 'represent to
themselves' their real conditions of existence?" (241B). Althusser
begins to treat this question by surveying solutions to it that have
been proposed in the past but are not the answer to it. It is not the case
that "Priests or Despots" (241B) forced people to imagine a condition
of full equal human freedom, as the Enlightenment perhaps urged us
to think. Nor is it the case, as Feuerbach and the early Marx urged,
that "material alienation" forced human subjects into ideological
imaginings (241B). Nor is it the case that God, through his Scriptures
or his papal servants, has himself in fact commanded us to take up a
certain evaluative stance toward existing relations of production.
This too is an ideology, a piece of false consciousness about the
possibility of equal freedom that is like any other in its structure and
significance (247A-248A). People believe variously "that they must
be obedient to God, to their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle, to
the boss, to the engineer, that thou shalt 'love thy neighbor as thyself,
etc." (248B). The cumulative force of these examples of "Enlighten-
ment ideology," "Feuerbachian-early Marxist ideology," and "Chris-
tian ideology," and so on, is that, altogether apart from commitment
to Lacanism, ideologizing - forming conceptions of possibilities of
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equal human freedom in reaction to existing relations of production-
is something people do. After all, it is here, and here, and here.
This historical evidence is then reinforced by — perhaps is even
itself developed out of — a deep sense people now have about the
conditions of their lives in complex societies. People are aware of the
existence under various forms of present social life of various forms
of unfreedom. The complexities of social life being what they are, and
the surveyable social alternatives all remaining marked by some
modes of domination, people feel powerless to do anything in social
life to increase human freedom significantly. Is it possible that human
beings may some day no longer have to work to satisfy their needs?
No. Is it possible that they may come to do their work without having
a structured social organization, within which some groups of people
(parents, judges, teachers, etc.) have powers that others lack? No. A
sense of powerlessness in the face of present modes of domination
and social complexities - perhaps the deepest legacy, in Paris, of May
1968 - when coupled with the apparent historical facts about ideol-
ogies, then leads to a sense that ideologies, hopeless reactions against
social unfreedom, are inevitable. Can we stop having them - either by
solving the problem of human freedom or by tragically accepting its
unsolvability - any more than we can stop dreaming? The thought
that we cannot has its plausibility. Human subjects, it seems, are
subjects of ideology.
HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ARTS
The consequences for art of such a view of human subjects are
immediate and powerful. Six habits of thought about art that are
motivated by the Althusserian view of subjects are powerfully
manifest in contemporary criticism (even if not always fully consist-
ent with one another).
(1) Where traditional Kantian critics, formalist critics, or humanist
Marxist critics (such as Marcuse)27 all see works of art and literature
as exemplary envisionings, born of genius in its engagement with a
tradition of such envisionings, of human freedom (variously con-
ceived in contexts), ideology critics under the influence of Althusser
and structural Marxism are now inclined to dwell less on the
contents of such envisionings and more on their internal structures
and (often disguised) histories of formation. Instead of elucidating an
author's or a painter's self-consciousness, genius, or understanding
of freedom, an ideological critic is more likely now to point to how
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the author or painter has been interpellated, that is, how the author
or painter has come to a vision of human freedom by interacting with
(perhaps refusing or negating) a sectarian piece of false conscious-
ness about how to accept, reform, or overthrow existing relations of
production so as to produce human freedom. Authors or painters will
be seen to have taken their sectarian and false reactions to existing
relations of production less from their genius in relation to tradition
than from the church, from the artistic elite, from a rising bourgeois
class, from the working class, from the consciousness of men, or
whatever, in all their one-sidedness. It will then further be pointed
out that the ideology thus inscribed in the work involves the repres-
sion or domination of some other social group - atheists or workers or
women or whatever - whose interests and (likewise, of course,
sectarian) conceptions of freedom are opposed to the interests and
conceptions of the social group from whom the artist's conception
was developed, the social group, that is, that "interpellated" the artist
as the subject or creator of his artistic production.
(2) To the extent that critics acknowledge any preferences for
particular works of art and literature, it will typically be not for
universalist works that pretend to speak from and to a universalist
human condition (works, as Wordsworth put it, of "a man speaking to
men"), but for explicitly localist works. Not Wordsworth but John
Clare, not Pollock or Rothko or Louis but local weavers and watercol-
orists, not John Updike but Raymond Carver, are the heroines and
heroes of art. Not high and universal works of art, but immediately
local productions of texts and artifacts are what is of interest: what is
naive, not what is sentimental, in Schiller's terms.28 As one recent,
prominent, feminist, post-Althusserian critic has claimed, the
"two-page autobiography," written in "the first decades of the
century" by an "anonymous 'Seamer on Men's Underwear,'" despite
its "somewhat hackneyed style" and artistically simple, "circum-
stantial," accumulations of "events from the melancholy to the
melodramatic," despite its cliches and "sentimentality," is at least
as interesting as other texts in that its writer "had a unique sense of
herself both as an individual and as member of the working class"
that she did not repress.29
(3) In keeping with the relative devaluing of high and universal art,
the aim of critical study is recast as knowledge of a work's contextual
conditions of determination, rather than appreciation or evaluation
of its envisionings. Critical study of the arts is now to tell us not how
we might best imagine our futures, how we might by following
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artistic envisionings of genius ourselves avoid sentimentality and
cliche, but rather how class and gender antagonisms in society are
"spoken" - both noticed and repressed - by the texts of art. Works of
art are now to be interrogated as showing us the social antagonisms
and illusions about their resolutions that were typical of members of
a certain class (author or painter and their audiences) in a given
society at a given time. The aim of criticism is not the elucidation of
the powers of high art, but positive historico-social knowledge.
(4) When artistic works do not explicitly comment upon or notice
their social conditions of production, this failure of notice will
typically be taken to have proceeded from unconscious notice over-
lain by repression. Works are read as palimpsests of such
unconscious awarenesses and their refusal. Thus, for example, we are
told that Wordsworth in writing "Tintern Abbey" must have been
aware of such things as the fact that the actual abbey was a site where
vagrant beggars from the armies of the Napoleonic wars sought alms,
but must further have repressed that awareness (while nonetheless
manifesting it to the canny reader) in titling his poem in full "Lines
Composed A Few MiJes Above Tintern Abbey, on revisiting the banks
of the Wye during a tour, July 13,1798" (italics added). And so on for
other bits of detail throughout the poem. In "Tintern Abbey," "the
primary poetic action is the suppression of the social."30 As one
trenchant critic of this way of reading has observed, it is not
obviously true that everything that is not present in a poem is
repressed or canceled. "Tintern Abbey" may be titled as it is largely
because it is a loco-descriptive poem, composed in a certain spot a
few miles above the abbey. If we are to say that "Tintern Abbey"
suppresses the social, then we might as well "say that a drawing
'cancels' the oil painting it might have been, or that a solo partita
'suppresses' the symphonic mode it might have been written in."31
Yet, against this criticism, the Althusserian critic has an extra-
ordinarily plausible general conception of the human subject as a
subject of ideology to deploy, and, armed with this conception, the
critic has very little trouble reading "Tintern Abbey" in detail, in
subtle and interesting ways, as arguing, just as the bourgeosie has
always argued, that significance and freedom are achieved in a
human life by individual minds in interaction with nature - surely, it
will be argued, a piece of false consciousness, an ideology. Once one
has a conception of the subject that encourages one to look for
expressions of ideology, they are not hard to find. Once found, they
do not appear to be accidental to the poem's argument and intentions.
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The aim of the canny critic is then to ferret out such unconscious
awarenesses and repressions in even those works that may seem most
innocent of them.
(5) To the extent that any attitudes toward existing relations of
production and evaluative, ideological reactions to them are held to
be more worth having than others, there is a pronounced tendency
within ideological criticism to favor diffuse attitudes of directionless
resistance. Rather than appreciating accommodationist or reformist
or revolutionist attitudes in art toward existing relations of pro-
duction, and rather than developing such attitudes on their own,
ideological critics of the arts will typically tend both to praise and to
maintain a certain sort of detachment and disengagement from the
political. This will often take the form of praising artistic and literary
works that, while acknowledging their social conditions of for-
mation, fail to achieve closure in a formed understanding of human
possibilities — fragmentary works, say, that simply break off, or that
reveal the authors' disunity of subjectivity in her or his multiple,
inconsistent interpellations. (There are obvious affinities with post-
structuralist and deconstructionist stances here.) Here the prefer-
ences will be against Anne Tyler and for Thomas Pynchon and
Donald Barthelme, against Helen Frankenthaler and for Robert Raus-
chenberg and Jasper Johns, against Jennifer Bartlett and for Cindy
Sherman. The sublimities of resistance to, refusal of, being any one
thing in social life, intermingled with awareness that social life
solicits or interpellates us in various ways, is the hallmark of
advanced artistic and critical consciousness.
(6) The interest in sectarian interpellations rather than in contents
of artistic envisionings, the preference for localism against (always
inauthentic) universalism, the seeking of socio-historical knowledge
rather than the developing of elucidatory appreciations, the attention
to unconscious awarenesses and repressions in all works, and the
development and appreciation of rhetorics of resistances without
closures, all tend to encourage a considerable shyness or hesitancy
about evaluation in the arts. From what standpoint, in whose name,
could standards or even looser principles of evaluation be devel-
oped? Do not conceptions of artistic success and value themselves
proceed from the very same class affiliations and interpellations as
artistic works themselves? At best, it seems, the critic might "inter-
vene" in cultural life from a particular point of view, writing as a
partisan of the working class, as a woman, as an elite modernist, or
whatever. "Disinterested" "rational" evaluation seems to disappear
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along with disinterested, universal artistic production. (And it is
hard to see how dogmatic invocations of taste in the manner of Hilton
Kramer or of Clement Greenberg in places will be of much help in
resisting the conception of the human subject as ideological that
underlies this evaluative hesitancy.)
These six features permeate the artistic and literary criticism of our
cultural moment. They are fed by historical considerations about
persistent unfreedom in human societies displaying various class
relations coupled with a kind of despair or hopelessness about
bringing human freedom into the world in social life. These historical
considerations and this sense of despair are powerfully expressed in
Althusser's "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses." Against the
vision of the human subject as ideological that it puts forward, it will
not do to point to the fact that that essay itself has an ideological
stance. "Of course," an Althusserian will reply, "it does: the essay is
itself an intervention, not a master discourse. See if you can do better,
can write from the point of view of humanity as such; you can't." Nor
will it do to attack the six habits of thought that permeate contempo-
rary criticism piecemeal or on their own, without engaging with the
general Althusserian conception of the human subject that supports
them. Nor will it do simply to deny the historical considerations
about domination and the present sense of despair that Althusser
expresses and that people feel. The historical considerations are well
founded; unfreedom and varieties of evaluative response to it have
existed under manifold forms of social life, under wide varieties of
relations of production. And how would one criticize a sense of
despair? There is perhaps not even any question of whether Althus-
serian conceptions of the human subject and Althusserian critical
stances are true or false apart from whether we do or do not manage to
recover a kind of self-confidence as human subjects. Althusserianism
may reasonably seem less attractive if, but only if, we manage to
recast our social lives and class relations as expressions of a universal
human interest. And how would we do that?
But perhaps - this must be tentative - there is a way of accepting
Althusserian, relations-of-production-Marxist historical insights and
of acknowledging the naturalness of present social despair while
shifting slightly the tone in which these insights and this despair are
given voice. Perhaps it is true that the history of successive forms of
relations of production is a history of successive forms of human
domination. Perhaps it is true that human beings naturally react
evaluatively to such domination and fantasize or envision its amelior-
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ation or removal. Perhaps it is true that their envisionings proceed
always in part from a class position, from interpellations, and are not
fully attractive to those outside that class position. Perhaps their art
must always reflect such sectarian envisionings, rooted in the his-
torical experiences of classes. Aaron Copland is not Charlie Parker;
Raymond Carver is not John Updike. Explaining and elucidating
artistic and literary production as reflecting in part the experiences
and outlooks of a social class is a standing possibility for criticism.
Yet there may also be distinctions to be drawn. Althusserian
criticism tends to regard all sectarian envisionings of human freedom
as equivalent in value. Roughly, from the facts that all such envi-
sionings are in part sectarian and in part unattractive to some
members of some classes at some historical time, it is concluded that
all such envisionings, and all artistic productions that express them,
are equally worthless: hence the structuralism, the localism, the
interest in knowledge not appreciation, the attention to repressed
awarenesses of complicities, the rhetorics of diffuse resistances, and
the shyness about evaluation that dominate contemporary criticism.
But equivalent one-sidedness in envisionings of human freedom
does not entail equivalent worthlessness. To develop, albeit against a
sectarian background, new forms of shared aspiration, individuality,
and intelligibility, and to do that with grace and power and craft, is
not mechanically to reproduce socialized humanity as it stands, but
to call us in some specific ways to something better. James Michener
is not Salman Rushdie; Jerry Lewis is not Jean Renoir; Tony Roche is
not Rod Laver. Appreciation and elucidation of such socially inflec-
ted exercises of grace and power and craft are likewise standing
possibilities of criticism.
Human subjects have common multiple interests. They are not
prisoners of the interests of their classes. Workers and owners, men
and women, serfs and lords, peasants and bureaucrats, may all have
interests among other things in their autonomy and in human
solidarity, in health, in discovering and cultivating their talents
whatever they may be, or in their friends and families. It may well be
that there can be no society, no set of relations of productions, that
enables the universal and full satisfaction of all these divergent
interests. Under some sets of relations of production, certain of these
genuine and universal human interests may be more fully repressed
than under others, and more fully repressed for certain classes than
for others. When it happens that under an existing set of relations of
production certain genuine human interests are repressed, then in
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reaction certain utterances, images, musical themes, plastic forms,
and so on can remind us — all of us — of the importance of these inter-
ests. Such reminders to us all then stand as culturally specific and
personal expressions of common aspirations to a collective freedom.
A society of whatever political structure in which wide ranges of such
reminders are encouraged and attended to is at least in that respect
better than one in which they are not. Art may serve, as one critic has it,
in a vision that is not so far, perhaps, from what is common to human-
ist Marxism, New Criticism, post-Aristotelian historicist humanism,
and Kantianism, as the perennial "cultural psychic monitoring"32 of
what we have done and continue to do to ourselves under various
relations of production and as the exemplary envisioning of something
better. Such artistic envisionings, inflected by the sectarian though
they may be, offer us various "models of what we can make of our-
selves" that "elicit fundamental forms of desire and admiration," call
to us not to repeat or imitate them but to follow after them in liberating
our common humanity against a background of culture.33
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